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Physician-Assisted Suicide:
The Legal and Practical Contours
Anthony J. Dangelantonio*
Introduction
The act of allowing a patient to die from an underlying terminal
illness when the treatment is ineffective is fundamentally different from
endowing the terminally ill with the right to request another to assist in
the act of dying. The former represents situations addressed by living
wills statutes. 1 As for the latter, few issues are of greater personal or
moral concern than whether to legally-sanction one person's actively
assisting another who wants to end his or her life.2 This is particularly
true when the person furnishing the assistance is a physician.
Initiatives allowing doctor-assisted suicide are being considered in
Maine, Michigan, Florida, Oregon, Iowa and New Hampshire.3 The
issues raised by such legislation strike at the very heart of our societal
and cultural matrix by calling into question the traditional roles of the
physician and patient. By creating an explicit legal right to have a doctor
assist in a patient's death, such legislation could alter forever the practice
of medicine by redefining the doctor-patient relationship.
This paper will briefly consider two legislative proposals that
received widespread attention and ultimately failed. It will also consider
one currently pending in New Hampshire. Before doing so, however, it
* Mr. Dangelantonio received a B.A. in philosophy from St. Joseph's University
in Philadelphia, PA, and an M.A. in philosophy from Saint Louis University. He
received his J.D. in 1992 from Franklin Pierce Law Center, and was recently admitted
to the New Hampshire Bar.
1 A living will governs the withholding or withdrawal of life-support from
individuals in the event of incurable or irreversible conditions that will cause death
within a relatively short time, and when persons are no longer able to make decisions
regarding their medical treatment. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1599 (6th ed. 1990).
2 Susan M. Wolf, Final Exit: The End of Argument, Hastings Center Rept.,
Jan./Feb. 1992, at 30-32.
3 James Podgers, Matters of Life and Death, 78 A.B.A. J., 60,61 (1992).
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will consider the perspective of the medical profession and the extent to
which the courts have been able to address patients' right to autonomy,
including the right to die.
It will also discuss several competing policy objectives that must be
resolved in deciding whether to permit a patient to have assistance in
dying. Finally, focusing particularly on the New Hampshire proposal,
the paper will show that even if physician assistance is to be afforded,
many issues must nevertheless be resolved.
The Dilemma Faced by the Medical Profession
There is an unavoidable tension within the medical profession
founded on the inability to always sustain life while relieving suffering.
The traditional doctor-patient relationship, and the practice of medicine
itself is transformed when a qualified patient can demand death as a
treatment option.
The American Medical Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, in accordance with the Hippocratic Oath, has held that
physicians may intend to save lives and relieve suffering, but they may
not intend as their primary purpose the deaths of their patients.4 Thus
their position is that patient autonomy can never offset the mandates of
the Hippocratic Oath.
For most people, there is a "viscerally felt distinction between acting
to hasten death and refraining from delaying death."5 There is fear that
allowing doctors to assist in killing patients would ultimately result in
desensitizing doctors to the value of human life.6 It is argued that to
allow such action would be "to mistakenly impute more power to human
action than it actually has and to accept the conceit that nature has now
fallen wholly within the realm of human control."7 The fear is that "if
4 Kenneth Kipnis, Physician Participation in Assisted Suicide, 263 J. A.M.A.
1197-98 (1990).
5 ua
6 Robert L. Misbin, Physicians' Aid in Dying, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1307,
1309 (1991).
7 DANIEL CALLAHAN, To Kill and to Ration: Preserving the Difference, in WHAT
KINDOF LIF : THE LMITS OF MEDICALPROGRESS 233 (1990).
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medicine's power over life may be used equally to heal or to kill, the
doctor is no more a moral professional but rather a morally neutered
technician." 8 The inherent risk is that society's faith in doctors as
healers and helpers would become subverted.9
Whether affirmatively to assist a patient who chooses to die is a
double-edged sword for the medical profession. Doctors will be called
killers if they accede, selfish and paternalistic if they refuse. Either way,
physicians will have to work hard to convince skeptics that they acted in
accordance with patients' final wishes, and without coercion,
intimidation or rashness of judgment. 10
The Common Law and Constitutional Context
of Personal Autonomy in Medical Decision Making
Based on the common law11 of most jurisdictions, competent,
terminally ill patients may request the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment even when this decision will result in their
death. 12 This right is grounded in the patient's common law right to
self-determination and the right to be free from offensive, non-
consensual touchings. 13
Such rights also have state and federal constitutional underpinnings.
Under the U.S. Constitution, they flow from the liberty provision of the
Due Process Clause1 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 15 In New
8 W. Gaylin. L.R. Cass, E.D. Pellegrino & M. Siegler, Doctors Must Not Kill,
259 J. A.M.A. 2139 (1988).
9 Samuel F. Hunter, Active Euthanasia Violates Fundamental Principles, 262 J.
A.M.A. 3074 (1989).
10 Paul A. Drey & James J. Giszczak, May I Author My Final Chapter? Assisted
Suicide and Guidelines to Prevent Abuse, 18 J. LEGISLATION 331, 337 (1992).
11 The term "common," as opposed to statutory law, refers to a body of principles
and rules of action deriving from historical customs and traditions, or from judgments
of the courts recognizing and applying the same.
12 Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1986); Satz v.
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1978).
13 Schloendorff v. Soc'y N.Y. Hospital, 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
14 In fact, the federal Constitution has two Due Process Clauses, one in the Fifth
Amendment restricting the federal government, another in the Fourteenth Amendment
restricting states. The latter provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law."
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Hampshire, for example, they are grounded in part I, articles 2 and 3 of
the state Constitution, which have been interpreted as guaranteeing that
"individuals have a constitutional right to privacy, arising from a high
regard for human dignity and self-determination, and that this right may
be asserted to prevent unwanted infringements of bodily
integrity.... "16
However, the right of a competent, terminally ill patient to refuse
unwanted medical treatments is not absolute. Traditionally, the states
have asserted specific, countervailing interests. Four commonly asserted
interests are: 1) the preservation of life; 2) the prevention of suicide; 3)
the protection of innocent third parties; and 4) maintaining the ethical
integrity of the medical profession. 17 In Satz v. Perlmutter, a
competent, terminally ill man suffering from Lou Gehrig's Disease18
sought to have his respirator removed. 19 Notwithstanding the
countervailing state's interests which were asserted, the Satz court
agreed with an earlier decision that:20
there is a substantial distinction in the state's insistence that
human life be saved where the affliction is curable, as
Also, there is procedural and substantive due process. The former guarantees fair
procedures prior to the deprivation of constitutionally protected liberty or property
interests; see Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The latter insures that the
substantive constitutional rights are protected; see, e.g., Regents of the University
of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
15 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990) (O'Connor and
Scalia, JJ., concurring).
16 In re Caulk, 480 A. 2d 93, 95 (N.H. 1984) citing Comm'r of Corrections v.
Myers 399 N.E. 2d 452,455 (Mass. 1979).
See also, e.g., Article I, § 1, the California Constitution. It provides that all
persons have certain inalienable rights among which are "enjoying and defending life
and liberty.., and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy."
17 See Matter of Storar, 420 N.E. 2d 64, 71 (N.Y. 1981), cert. denied; 454 U.S.
858 (1981); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160,162-163 (Fla. App. 1978); Sup't
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz 370 N.E. 2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
18 Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis.
19 See Satz, 362 So. 2d at 161.
20 Id. at 162-63, quoting Saikewicz, 370 N.E. 2d, at 425-426. Saikewicz ruled
that a guardian for a mentally incompetent, terminally ill patient has the right to
refuse medical treatment if it can be determined that the patient would have refused
such treatment while still mentally competent.
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opposed to the state's interest where.., the issue is not
whether, but when, for how long and at what cost to the
individual [his] life may be briefly extended.
Legislative Initiatives Generally
As mentioned earlier, allowing a patient to die by refusing treatment
is one thing and allowing them to do so by affirmative acts is another.
The former has been permitted on common law and constitutional, as
well as on legislative grounds. However, courts are unlikely to permit
the latter without legislative approval - especially in the face of statutes
that forbid it. As discussed below, attempts to secure such legislative
approval have so far also failed. However, before discussing them, it is
useful to consider general policy arguments that have been advanced on
both sides.
Supporter Perspectives
Proponents of assisted-death legislation herald it as the most humane
and dignified way to treat competent, terminally ill patients. They point
to the sanctity of the person and the right of self-determination by
ending "medical paternalism which sometimes leads to the imposition of
coercive life-prolonging measures in a manner insensitive to the
patient's autonomy."2 1 Indeed, some supporters of doctor-assisted
suicide assert that such legislation would in fact send a positive message
to the public that doctors care and are willing to help a patient carry out
their final wishes. The corollary of this message is that the medical
profession cares enough to prevent dying patients and their families
from enduring the emotional and economic hardships caused by the
continuation of hopeless medical and technological intervention.
Moreover, it is argued that assisted-death laws would put an end to the
cold and depersonalizing experience of dying in a health care facility,
thereby ending blind compliance with the technological imperative
which dictates that all available medical or technological means,
whatever their chance for success, should be attempted.
21 Yeates Conwell & Eric D. Caine, Rational Suicide and the Right to Die:
Reality and Myth, 325 N. ENG. J. MED. 1100 (1991).
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Other proponents have argued that it would be unethical not to assist
patients in dying after a doctor has brought a patient to a state of
extended suffering and can do no more.22 The point of this argument is
that it would be ethically and professionally inconsistent for doctors to
bring a patient to a point of painful existence with no hope for cure or
relief from the suffering, and then abandon such a patient because
assisting in their death violates the principles of the profession. 23
Some supporters assert a qualified acceptance of assisted-death laws
provided three prerequisites are met: 1) the request to die must not stem
from a treatable depression; 2) the request for death must not stem from
treatable discomfort, symptoms, or pain; and 3) the exploration of the
request to die must take place within the context of a relationship
between physician and patient of some duration, depth, and
intimacy. 24 The danger exists in whether the relationship between the
patient and an acute care physician ever develops into one of any depth
or intimacy prior to the patient's request for assisted death from that
physician.
Arguments of Opponents
Those who oppose assisted suicide point to the fact that once the
suicide boundary is crossed, it marks the beginning of systematic
devaluation of human life and would likely be the initial step toward the
gradual performance of assisted suicides on mentally or physically
disabled persons, or on non-terminally ill patients whose wish for death
stems from depression or poor quality of life.2 5 Many opponents of
such legislation argue from the position that there is no absolute
personal autonomy over one's life, and that the fabric of law and society
is founded on this principle. In addition, detractors posit that assisted
suicide laws would transform the right into an implied duty; that is,
terminally ill persons might feel pressured to die sooner so as to not
22 Guy I. Benrubi, Euthanasia: The Need for Procedural Safeguards, 326 N. ENG.
J. MED. 197 (1992).
23 Id., at 198.
24 R.C. Klagsbrun, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Double Dilemma, 6 J. PAIN
SYMPTOM MGMr. 325-28 (1991).
25 Breo, MD-Aided Suicide Voted Down, 266 J. A.M.A. 2895 (1991).
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consume scarce and valuable medical resources, and to avoid imposing
substantial hardships on, e.g., their families. Opponents point
vigorously to the absence of some form of universal health care
insurance as the impetus behind families and health care facilities
exerting subtle pressures on patients to end their own lives because of
the costs associated with life-sustaining treatment. 26 They argue that
the risks of abuse by physicians is too great, and that pain management
and care might not be pursued as vigilantly where assisted death is an
alternative.27
Failed Legislative Proposals
Initiative 119: The Washington Aid-In-Dying Measure
In November 1991, the issue of doctor-assisted suicide made
national headlines when voters in Washington state defeated Initiative
119 (1-119), also known as the "aid-in-dying" proposal, by a 55-45%
margin. 2 8 That measure was proposed as part of a three part
amendment to the state's living will statute.2 9 Two parts - broadening
the definition of "terminally ill" to include patients in a persistent
vegetative state and irreversible coma, and allowing removal of
artificially administered food and water - received widespread support
from the state's medical society.30
The third, however, would have given competent, terminally ill
patients the right to have:31
aid in the form of a medical service provided in person by a
physician, that will end the life of a conscious and mentally
competent qualified patient in a dignified, painless, and
humane manner, when requested voluntarily by the patient
through a written directive in accordance with this chapter at
the time the medical service is to be provided.
26 See Podgers, supra note 3.
27 David Orentlicher, Physician Participation in Assisted Suicide, 262 J. A.M.A.
1844-45 (1989).
28 See Breo, supra note 25.
29 Wash. Rev. Code. Ann. §§ 70.122.010-70.122.905 (Natural Death Act).
30 Breo, supra note 25, at 2896.
31 Wa. Legis. I. M. 119 (1991), § 2 (9) (LEXIS, State library, Wa-Legis file).
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Although the term "medical service" was left undefined, materials
distributed by the Washington Citizens For Death With Dignity indicated
that it would include prescriptions for an overdose of barbiturates for
patients who could swallow or intravenous administration of
medications to sedated patients who could not.32 Also, 1-119 required
assisted-death directives to be executed at the time service was to be
provided and precluded incompetent patients from receiving aid on the
basis of previously executed directives. Moreover, the service was to be
rendered in the presence of the assisting physician.
The state's medical associations opposed such assistance by a 5-1
margin. 33
Proposition 161: The California Death with Dignity Act
Moreover, on November 3, 1992, California voters, 54-46%,
defeated a similar initiative. The California Medical Association, the
Roman Catholic Church and various nurse, hospital and senior citizen
groups contended that the proposal was flawed because it lacked
important procedural safeguards, including requirements for a
psychological examination, a waiting period and family involvement in
the decision. 34 Such opponents raised over $3 million, more than four
times the amount raised by supporters, and waged an aggressive, high-
profile radio and television campaign right up to the last minute. 35
However, supporters, including the American Civil Liberties Union,
Unitarian clergy and Californians against Human Suffering, were
buoyed by a rapidly-growing right-to-die movement and seem to be
convinced that such legislation will eventually pass.36
Proposition 161 would have provided "mentally competent and
terminally ill adults the legal right to voluntarily request and receive
physician-aid-in-dying." 37 Doctors or other health care professionals
32 Misbin, supra note 6, at 1307-08.
33 Id
34 Paul Jacobs & Virginia Ellis, Proposition 65 and Right-to-Die Measure Trail,
Los Angeles Times, Nov. 4, 1992, Al, col. 1.
35 Miiranda Ewell, Voters Reject Contrversial Measure, San Jose Mercury News,
Nov. 4, 1992, EL17.
36 Id.
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would not have been required to participate, but those doing so would
not have been liable in any criminal, civil or administrative proceeding
for complying with a patient's directive. 38 The proposition also
required a patient's requests to be enduring and his or her revocable
directive to be witnessed by two persons meeting specified
requisites. 3 9 Ultimately, the patient would have determined the time
and place for dying40 by telling the treating physician that the time had
arrived.4 1
The New Hampshire Death with Dignity Act
What it Provides
Yet another proposal is being considered in New Hampshire. If
passed, it would allow mentally competent persons, at least 18 years of
age and suffering from a terminal condition,42 to execute written
directives witnessed by two independent persons. 4 3 Such directives
would instruct attending physicians to "prescribe medications which will
enable the patient to self-administer such medications and so control the
time, place and manner of his or her death."4 4
The attending physician or the health care facility where the patient
resides may choose not to comply. Should a physician or facility choose
not to comply, good-faith efforts must be made to transfer the patient so
as to satisfy the patient's request.4 5 However, were the attending
37 Proposed California Death with Dignity Act, Cal. Civil Code, Title 10.5, §
2525.1. Hereafter cited as California Proposal §....
38 California Proposal, §§ 2525.8, 2525.9.
39 California Proposal, § 2525.3.
40 California Proposal, § 2525.7.
41 California Proposal, §2525.24.
42 H.R. 1275, 1992 Seas., §137-K:2 (III).
43 Ia
Moreover, § 137-K:6 (II) contains a pregnancy exception. A patient's request
cannot be honored if the patient is pregnant and the attending physician has
knowledge of the pregnancy.
44 H.R. 1275, 1992 Sess., § 137-K:3 (1). This section of the bill contains a sample
written directive.
45 H.R. 1275, 1992 Sess., § 137-K-5 (1).
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physician to choose to comply, the terminal condition would have to be
certified in writing by a second physician competent in the particular
disease category. Also, the attending physician would be required to
consult, e.g., an appropriate medical ethics committee 4 6 before
complying. The ethics committee would then be obligated to review the
patient's prognosis, competence and knowledge of all relevant facts, as
well as to determine that the decision was truly voluntary and give the
patient a chance to be heard.47 Nevertheless, "the decision to fulfill the
patient's request is solely the responsibility of the attending
physician. '" 4 8
Afterward, persons assisting attending physicians, including
hospital or facility staff and members of the ethics committee, would be
immune from civil, criminal, and administrative liability, provided they
act in accordance with reasonable medical standards.49
Problems with the New Hampshire Proposal
The drafters of the New Hampshire bill seem to seek a compromise
by lessening the involvement of physicians in patient assisted suicide.
The only thing that patients are clearly entitled to, if they can find a
cooperating physician, is a prescription adequate to their needs. This
raises several problems.
First, one should consider patients who are incapable of self
administration. If the provision is truly designed to prevent assistance,
this is difficult to understand. If respect for individual autonomy and
dignity is the underlying rationale and physicians can assist by
prescribing, it seems arbitrary to deny additional assistance to
quadriplegics or others incapable of self-administration. 50
46 H.R. 1275, 1992 Sess., § 137-K:4.
4 7 Idt
48 It
49 H.R. 1275, 1992 Sess., §137-K:5 (I1).
50 See, e.g., McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990) and State v.
Mcfee, 385 S.E. 2d 651 (Ga. 1989) (both granting the request of a competent, non-
terminal, but irreversibly ill, respirator-dependent quadriplegic to have his respirator
removed and to be administered a sedative to ease the pain of his inevitable death).
See also, Matter of Farrell, 529 A. 2d 404 (NJ. 1987) (right of competent,
terminally ill adult physically paralyzed by Lou Gehrig's Disease to have her husband
remove her respirator outweighed the state's interest in sustaining her life).
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Second, insofar as mentally competent patients can receive
medication and choose when, if ever, to use it, there is a possibility that
they will no longer be competent when they choose to do so. Is a
physician obligated to retrieve medication from such a person? In its
present form, the bill does not address the durability of an assisted-death
directive; there is no explicit guidance regarding the validity of an
executed directive upon the patient's subsequent incompetence. 5! Also,
the New Hampshire bill does not address whether a patient's wish to die
can be effectuated by a surrogate decision maker.
Finally, because the New Hampshire proposal does not require a
physician to be present at the time the patient plans to die, two additional
problems are presented. Requiring a doctor's presence would reduce the
incidence of failed attempts and the occurrence of painful and inhumane
situations which the bill aims to prevent. Moreover, making the death a
strictly private affair also seems to make it less likely that patients will
die in caring and supportive surroundings.52 Minimally, the presence
of a physician would lessen the emotional and psychological burdens of
the patient at this critical time.
Such problems should be addressed by legislatures rather than left
for the courts to resolve as best they can.53
51 By comparison, Washington 1-119 defined "aid-in-dying" as a medical service to
be provided "in person by a physician... when requested through a written directive...
at the time the medical service is to be provided." Supra note 31.
52 See, e.g., In the Matter of Beverly Requena, 517 A. 2d 886 (N.J. Super. Ch.
1986), aff'd, 517 A. 2d 869 (NJ. Super. App. Div. 1986) (competent, terminally ill
patient has right to die by refusing of artificial food and fluids in the hospital where
she had resided for the last seventeen months notwithstanding hospital's policy
against withholding such treatment).
53 Recently, world-wide attention has been focused on the Netherlands. See Jerome
Socolovsky, Most Liberal Mercy-Killing Guidelines in Europe Adopted, an
Associated Press report appearing in, e.g., the Concord (N.H.) Monitor, Feb. 10,
1993, at A3.
Although the legislation approved by parliament stops short of
legalization, it guarantees physicians immunity from prosecution if
they follow strict guidelines for mercy killing .... The compromise
represents a middle ground between Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers'
Christian Democratic Party, which faced fierce opposition from a
religious flank, and the Labor Party, which sees the right to euthanasia
as a fundamental personal choice.
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Conclusion
Proponents of legislation permitting others to help patients commit
suicide must overcome a host of policy objections. They must also
overcome strong opposition by, e.g., health care professionals who see
undesirable change in the nature of their relationships with patients.
Yet, once those hurdles are cleared, the job is not over. First, laws
recognizing mentally competent patients' rights of autonomy and self-
determination with regard to time and manner of death must also contain
safeguards to ensure that patients receive equal treatment and are not
coerced, as well as to ensure that patient requests are carried out in the
most compassionate manner. Second, such laws must recognize the
rights of health professionals to decline to do what they find morally or
professionally unacceptable. The New Hampshire bill seems to
demonstrate that, if legislation attempts to satisfy the second objective
by minimizing the involvement of health care professionals, it may well
fail to achieve its primary objectives.
